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COMMENTS
DESEGREGATION-THE TIMES THEY ARE A-
CHANGIN'
Courts are currently concerned over the extent of their powers to
integrate racially separate housing and schools within metropolitan
areas containing black inner cities and white suburbs. While the
overall population of cities is stabilizing or decreasing, the black
population within them is increasing,' resulting in a heavy concen-
tration of blacks in central city neighborhoods,2 surrounded by a
predominantly white urban fringe and white suburbs.3 Housing pat-
terns within these areas are racially segregated.4 There is also wide-
spread racial segregation in cities' schools,5 sonietimes fostered by
school board policies which result in schools reflecting the racial
makeup of the surrounding community.6 Consequently, courts have
been called upon to approve interdistrict plans to achieve integrated
systems. 7
This Comment is concerned with instances in which it is a proper
exercise of a court's equity jurisdiction to fashion a metropolitan or
interdistrict remedial order in which the city and its surrounding
suburbs are treated as one system. The interdistrict remedial tool
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE U.S. 16 (1972).
2. Id. at 26.
3. Id. From 1950 to 1970 the areas surrounding the central cities gained
over thirty-five million people, of whom approximately one and one-half
million were black. Id.
4. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 12 (1967); see Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 586-87 (E.D.
Mich. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1913), rev'd on other grounds,
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
5. Ribicoff, The Future of School Integration in the United States, 1
J. LAW & ED. 1, 10 (1972).
6. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 222-23 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT
HOME 13 (1969).
7. See note 8 infra.
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has been discussed in five recent cases,' including one which arose
8. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974); Bradley v. Milliken, 484
F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 418 U.S. 717 (1974);
Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973); United States v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind. 1973), rev'd in part, 503 F.2d 68
(7th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court has never explicitly stated what would
constitute a constitutionally acceptable racially segregated situation. The
implication of Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), however,
is that a de facto situation would not be actionable; a de jure finding is
the predicate to actionable segregation. Id. at 198. The difference between
de facto and de jure is the purpose or intent to segregate. Id. at 208. Two
Justices have denounced the distinction. Justice Douglas believes that all
school segregation is the result of state action and is therefore remediable.
Id. at 215 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Powell feels that it is regionally
discriminatory to presume continued segregative intent in the South
twenty years after segregative legislation is off the books and not so pre-
sume in the North where the same segregation exists. Those seeking deseg-
regation should be relieved of the burden of identifying segregative acts
and deducing "segregative intent." Id. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting in
part). He would hold that "where segregated public schools exist within a
school district to a substantial degree, there is a prima facie case that the
duly constituted public authorities . . . are sufficiently responsible to
[shift to them the] burden to demonstrate they nevertheless are operating
a genuinely integrated school system." Id.; Cisneros v. Corpus Christi
Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S.
920 (1972), stated that discriminatory motive and purpose are not neces-
sary elements of a constitutional violation in the field of public education.
Id. at 149; see Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699
(E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 497 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, No. 74-
2076 (2d Cir. Jan. 27, 1975). Contra, Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of
Trustees, 488 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974);
Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Mich. 1973);
Morales v. Shannon, 366 F. Supp. 813 (W.D. Tex. 1973); Zamora v. New
Braunfels Independent School Dist., 362 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Tex. 1973);
Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1971), afj'd, 404 U.S. 1027
(1972). Milliken's description of a constitutional violation in terms of "de-
liberately maintained dual school systems" seems to indicate an element
of intent. 418 U.S. at 737. Individual states may act to cure de facto
segregation. See Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22.(2d Cir. 1967);
Booker v. Board of Educ., 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965); Addabbo v.
Donovan, 16 N.Y.2d 619, 209 N.E.2d 112, 261 N.Y.S.2d 68, cert. denied,
[Vol. HI
DESEGREGATION
in a housing context
Courts have the task to correct, "by a balancing of the individual
and collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitu-
tion."'" The "condition" existing in education is state mandated"
or deliberately maintained" dual systems in which certain schools
are for white students and others are for black students. Brown v.
Board of Education (Brown I)" called for the elimination of such
dual systems. 4 This is accomplished by a transition to a unitary
382 U.S. 905 (1965); Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 206 N.E.2d 174, 258
N.Y.S.2d 77 (1965); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester
School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967). A number of commentators
have agreed that the de facto-de jure distinction is outdated. Ribicoff, The
Future of School Integration in the United States, 1 J. LAW & ED. 1, 20
(1972); Shannon, Present Direction of Court Decisions Regarding Metro-
politan Area Desegregation, 1 J. LAW & ED. 587, 597-98 (1972); Wright,
Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 40
N.Y.U.L. REv. 285, 302-03 (1965). But see Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189 (1973); Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 488 F.2d
579 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974); Davis v. School Dist.,
443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971); United States v.
School Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943
(1971); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Mich.
1973); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D.
Ind. 1973), rev'd in part, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974); Hoots v. Pennsyl-
vania, 359 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Johnson v. San Francisco Unified
School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Spangler v. Pasadena
City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Taylor v. Board of
Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961).
9. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir.
1974).
10. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971).
11. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Wright v. Council of
the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); United States v. Scotland Neck
City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968); Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968); Monroe v. Board of
Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
1975]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
nonracial system" in which all vestiges of state imposed segregation
have been removed. 16
The primary responsibility for this transition rests with school
authorities; 7 where they fail to act, judicial authority may be in-
voked. 8 In assessing the effectiveness of school desegregation"9
plans,"0 courts are to be guided by equitable principles.2 The scope
of the remedy may be broad, "for breadth and flexibility are inher-
ent in equitable remedies." 22 In school desegregation cases it is
within the court's discretionary power to prevent the creation of new
school districts, to order expenditure of public funds,24 to alter
15. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968).
16. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15
(1971).
17. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
18. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15
(1971). The federal courts are empowered to grant injunctive relief pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3)-(4) (1970). They may grant declarative relief
pursuant to id. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
19. Congress has defined desegregation as the "assignment of students
to public schools and within such schools without regard to their race,
color, religion, or national origin, but 'desegregation' shall not mean the
assignment of students to public schools . . .to overcome racial imbal-
ance." Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1970), as amended,
(Supp. II, 1972). The courts have interpreted desegregation as more than
adherence to racially neutral policies. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17 (1971). The use of racial classifi-
cations must not be arbitrary or unrelated to a legitimate government
purpose. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190 (1964). There must be
a strong overriding justification for their use. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 11 (1967). Racial classifications which are designed to remedy state
maintained dual systems are permissible. North Carolina State Bd. of
Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971).
20. See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971);
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
21. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
22. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15
(1971).
23. See, e.g., Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451
(1972); United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484
(1972).
24. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964); see Eaton
v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 459 F.2d 684 (4th Cir. 1972); Brewer
v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
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school district lines,2 and to declare state laws invalid. 26 The issue
in each of the recent cases is whether the court has properly exer-
cised its equity jurisdiction.
The first case to consider a metropolitan area remedy was Bradley
v. School Board of the City of Richmond (Richmond),27 which held
that the district court lacked authority"8 to order enforcement of a
plan integrating city schools with those of two suburban counties. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that each of the
three school districts had successfully replaced former dual systems
with a unitary system.0 The court in Richmond concluded that the
desire of the district court to develop a viable racial mix,3 wherein
each school would have a twenty to forty percent minority enroll-
ment,3" was unwarranted because it constituted a fixed racial
quota,33 contrary to the directive of Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education.34 The Fourth Circuit stated that
the school district lines would be breachable only if it were shown
that their establishment had been racially motivated. 5 Although
25. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 27 (1971); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
26. See North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43
(1971); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27. 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided court, 412
U.S. 92 (1973).
28. 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972).
29. The three county school districts involved were Richmond, Hen-
rico, and Chesterfield.
30. Richmond began to desegregate in 1963 by means of a freedom of
choice plan which was found discriminatory in its administration. Bradley
v. School Bd., 317 F.2d 429, 438 (4th Cir. 1963). The plan itself was ap-
proved by the lower court. Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310, 315 (4th
Cir.), rev'd, 382 U.S. 103 (1965).
31. 462 F.2d at 1063.
32. Id. at 1064.
33. Id.
34. 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971). The Richmond court misinterpreted Swann.
Swann affirmed a lower court's use of a particular ratio of whites to blacks
of 71 to 29 percent because it was used merely as a starting point in
fashioning a remedy. The twenty percent permissible range with which the
district court was working in Richmond did not contravene Swann.
35. 462 F.2d at 1064.
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the court recognized that state and federal action had tended to
perpetuate ghettoization within Richmond as well as restricting the
housing location of black residents within the surrounding areas,3"
it concluded that this did not justify a metropolitan remedy without
a showing of intentional segregation brought about by a conspiracy
between the districts. 7
One year later, in Bradley v. Milliken (Bradley),38 the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that a district court could order the enforcement of a plan
which would have integrated the schools of up to fifty-four school
districts. Contrary to Richmond, the Detroit school system operated
segregated schools. 9 The Detroit school board was found to have
pursued policies which maintained the segregated schools. 0 The
36. Id. at 1065.
37. Id.
38. 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), aff'g 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich.
1972). This action was originally commenced in 1970 by the National Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People, attacking a Michigan stat-
ute. It was held that the statute interfered with the execution and opera-
tion of a voluntary plan of partial school desegregation adopted by the
Detroit school authorities, in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1970). On remand, plaintiffs
moved for a court order directing implementation of the original plan.
Such implementation was held dependent upon a finding that a constitu-
tional violation existed within Detroit schools. Bradley v. Milliken, 438
F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1971). The requisite segregation was found. Bradley v.
Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir.
1973).
39. No clear standard has emerged by which courts are to conclude that
actionable school segregation exists; it is dependent upon the facts of each
particular case. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 196 (1973).
Courts look at such things as the racial and ethnic composition of the
student body, faculty, and staff; the attitude of the community; and the
comparative skill of teachers, programs, and facilities within the district.
See generally Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
40. Attendance zones had been altered. 484 F.2d at 222. See also Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Davis v. School Dist., 443 F.2d
573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971); United States v. Board of
Educ., 429 F.2d 1253 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. School Dist. 151,
404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), afJ'd on rehearing, 380 F.2d 385 (5th
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state, by discriminatory authorization of transportation costs,4 en-
actment of legislation rescinding a voluntary desegregation plan,4"
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Hart v. Community
School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 497 F.2d 1027
(2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, No. 74-2076 (2d Cir. Jan. 27, 1975); Oliver v. Kalama-
zoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Mich. 1973); Johnson v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Taylor
v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961). Optional attendance zones had been
instituted. 484 F.2d at 233. See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S.
189 (1973); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655
(S.D. Ind. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920
(1973); Spangler v. Pasadena Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal.
1970). School construction policies were pursued which had the natural
and foreseeable effect of maintaining segregated schools. 484 F.2d at 235.
See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971);
Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 488 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent
School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973);
Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919
(1973); Davis v. School Dist., 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
913 (1971); Brewer v. School Bd., 397 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1968); United States
v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 395 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1968); Oliver v. Kala-
mazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Mich. 1973); United States
v. Board of School Comm'rs, 368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind. 1973), rev'd in
part, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School
Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1971); United States v. School Dist.
151, 286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F.
Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
940 (1961). The Richmond court also found that the Detroit school authori-
ties and the school authorities of a suburban school district had partici-
pated in a scheme in which black students from the suburban district were
bussed from the suburban district into black schools within Detroit, past
closer white suburban schools which could have accepted them. 484 F.2d
at 227.
41. 484 F.2d at 238. Detroit was denied any allocation of state funds
for pupil transportation although such funds were available for students
outside Detroit. The equal protection clause relates to equal protection
between persons and not between areas. Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S.
545, 551 (1954). A state has wide discretion in deciding which laws have
statewide application and which shall operate in only certain counties. Id.;
cf. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
42. 484 F.2d at 238.
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complicity in school construction policies,43 and approval of busing
black suburban pupils into Detroit," was also found to have contrib-
uted to the maintenance of segregation within Detroit's schools. 5
Because of the state's involvement 6 in the existing segregation and
the state's derivative responsibility for the actions of its local school
districts," the metropolitan remedy was held appropriate. The court
concluded that a Detroit-only desegregation plan would lead di-
43. Id.
44. Id. The state has ultimate control over bus routes. MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 388.1171 (Supp. 1970).
45. 484 F.2d at 241.
46. State action is found when school boards act. States act through
their agents. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880). School boards are
agents of the state. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973);
Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). A school board
acts when it sets policies on attendance zones, faculty employment, assign-
ments, school construction, closings, and consolidations. Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, supra at 227 (Powell, J., concurring in part); see United States
v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972). Lower courts have
utilized three standards to find the requisite intent necessary for actiona-
ble segregation. See note 8 supra. The oldest standard required something
approaching direct evidence. Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55
(6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967). More recent cases have
found the intent upon a showing that school authorities were aware of the
results of their policies. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp.
279 (D. Colo. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Other
cases have held school authorities to have intended the natural, foreseea-
ble, and probable consequences of their acts. Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of
Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143, 160 (W.D. Mich. 1973); Hoots v. Pennsylvania,
359 F. Supp. 807, 823 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp.
582, 592 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); see Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Pub-
lic Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARv. L. REV. 564, 584 (1965);
Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern
School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 697, 706 (1971). In Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), the Supreme Court noted another
instance in which malevolent intent may be inferred; where a finding of
intentional segregative state action is found with reference to a meaningful
part of the school system, and segregated schools exist within other parts
of the same system, the burden shifts to the school authorities to prove the
latter segregation is not the result of intentional state action. Id. at 208.
47. 484 F.2d at 242.
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rectly to a single segregated Detroit school district, overwhelmingly
black, surrounded by a ring of suburban school districts overwhelm-
ingly white. 8
The United States Supreme Court, in Milliken v. Bradley
(Milliken)," reversed the court of appeals and held that a metropoli-
tan remedy was improper. In an opinion written by Chief Justice
Burger, the Court held that an erroneous standard had been ap-
pliedw and that the lower court's ruling was not supported by evi-
dence that the acts of the suburban school districts had effected the
discrimination." According to the Court, an interdistrict remedy is
dependent upon finding an interdistrict violation;52 a constitutional
violation 3 within one district, committed either by the state or one
or more local school districts, must produce a significant segregative
effect in another district.54 The Chief Justice framed the controlling
principle to be that "the scope of the remedy is determined by the
nature and extent of the constitutional violation. ' 55
48. Id. at 249; accord, United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 368
F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind. 1973).
49. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
50. See note 46 supra and text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
51. 418 U.S. at 752.
52. Id.
53. See notes 8, 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
54. 418 U.S. at 744. An interdistrict order would have been proper had
a showing been made that segregated schools within Detroit produced a
significant segregative effect in the suburbs, or that suburban segregative
acts produced a significant segregative effect in other districts, or that the
state deliberately drew district lines on the basis of race. See Haney v.
County Bd. of Educ., 429 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Texas,
321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd in part, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1971).
55. 418 U.S. at 744. The nature of the violation refers to state action
which results in racial segregation in public schools. The extent of the
violation refers to who has committed the violation and over whom the
court may properly exercise its equity jurisdiction. For the purposes of a
remedial order the Milliken Court has distinguished the state from each
of its agencies. A finding of discriminatory activity must be made against
each school district in order to make it subject to a court's equity jurisdic-
tion, unless it can be shown that another state agency's discriminatory acts
have had significant segregative effects in the district under the former
state agent's control. Id. at 745.
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Prior to Milliken the school segregation cases decided by the Su-
preme Court had successively expanded courts' equity jurisdiction.
Brown P6 held that a cause of action would lie for state imposed
racial segregation in schools, but specifically excluded consideration
of the permissible parameters of a remedial order.57 A companion
case, Boling v. Sharpe,"8 applied the same principles to federally
imposed racial segregation in schools. Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown II)II was the first case in which the Court spoke of remedial
relief. It left the specifics to be worked out by district courts,"0 but
noted that these courts could consider such problems as school ad-
ministration, physical condition of the schools, school transporta-
tion systems, personnel, and revision of school district and atten-
dance areas." There was no indication that the Court in Brown II
considered any one of these factors more important than any of the
others.2
Brown 11 recognized that weighing these various factors and local
complexities could be a time consuming process. 3 Thirteen years
later, in Green v. County School Board" the Court concluded that
school authorities operating dual systems were obligated to
formulate desegregation plans which would work immediately."
Green had before it the narrow issue of whether a freedom of choice
plan, racially neutral on its face, which did not result in any change
in the racial indentifiability of the county's schools, was an accepta-
ble compliance with the school board's duty to desegregate. Green
held it was not.66 In its next major school desegregation decision,
56. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
57. Id. at 495.
58. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
59. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
60. Id. at 299.
61. Id. at 300.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
65. Id. at 439. The Court subsequently rejected efforts to slow down the
speed with which segregation was to be accomplished. See Northcross v.
Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232 (1970); Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of
Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396
U.S. 226 (1969).
66. 391 U.S. at 441; see Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968);
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Swann,17 the Court specifically dealt with the responsibility of
school authorities in desegregating dual systems." It upheld the
authority of lower courts to use racial percentages as a starting point
in shaping remedies, 8 to cluster and group attendance zones,", and
to order the busing of pupils."
One year later, Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia72 upheld
a lower court's equity jurisdiction to enjoin the creation of a new
school district from an existing district which had not yet completed
the process of desegregation.73 The Court stated that "desegregation
is not achieved by splitting a single school system operating 'white
schools' and 'Negro schools' into two new systems, each operating
unitary schools within its borders, where one of the two new systems
is, in fact, 'white' and the other is, in fact, 'Negro'."74
Milliken, in limiting a desegregation order to the school district
in which violations have been found, cited most of the above cases
for the proposition that it is only within the context of established
geographic and administrative school systems that terms such as
"unitary," "dual," and "racially identifiable" have meaning.75
While it is true that the cited cases arose in the context of estab-
lished school systems, it does not necessarily follow that they stand
for the proposition that a stricter test need be met to bridge school
district lines than, for instance, attendance zones." None of the
cases cited by the Chief Justice ever intimated that established
Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968) (free transfer plan held
inadequate).
67. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
68. Id. at 18.
69. Id. at 25. Courts may not use racial percentages as an inflexible
requirement. Id.
70. Id. at 27. The attendance zones need not be contiguous or compact.
Id.
71. Id. at 30. The busing is limited by the risk to the health of students
and significant impingement on the educational process. Id.
72. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
73. Id. at 470.
74. Id. at 463. The same principle was applied in a companion case,
United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972),
where the creation of a new school district by statute was invalidated.
75. 418 U.S. at 746.
76. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
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school district boundaries were anything other than convenient, nor
did they involve lower court findings of direct state participation in
the maintenance of a segregated established school system."
Milliken rejected the conclusion that school district lines were no
more than arbitrary lines drawn on a map for political convenience
which can be casually ignored."8 The Chief Justice stated:
No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought
essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for
public schools and to quality of the educational process.7
The difficulty with this position is that it does not consider that
parental concern and interest over the education of one's child is not
apt to diminish simply because the controlling school board has
shifted location.
Milliken noted that Michigan provides for a large measure of local
control over education. 0 Yet, it has long been established that infe-
rior state entities are merely subordinate governmental instrumen-
talities created by the state to assist in carrying out governmental
functions.8 ' School districts in Michigan have been held to be state
agencies, 82 created and empowered by the state;" state control is
pervasive, 4 extending to consolidation and merger of school districts
77. Brown I was concerned with a statute that permitted but did not
require school segregation. 347 U.S. at 486 n.1. Neither Green, Swann, or
Emporia contained any findings of direct state involvement in the extant
school segregation. There was direct state involvement in United States v.
Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972), but it did not arise
until an interim desegregation order had been submitted; no claim of state
creation or perpetuation was involved. Id. at 486-87.
78. 418 U.S. at 741-42.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 742 n.20. The local school district, inter alia, establishes
attendance zones, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 340.589 (1967), hires and
contracts with personnel, id. § 340.566, and levies taxes for operations, id.
§ 340.563.
81. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964); Hunter v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
82. School Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 367 Mich. 591, 600, 116 N.W.2d
866, 870 (1962).
83. Board of Educ. v. Elliot, 319 Mich. 436, 29 N.W.2d 902 (1947).
84. The legislature contributes a large portion of the operating funds
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without the district's approval.85
The majority in Milliken evidenced a reluctance to become fur-
ther involved in the educational thicket. The Court expressed con-
cern that district courts would initially become a de facto "legisla-
tive authority" and then "school superintendent" for the entire
area."8 Though the issue of local application is for the district court, 7
the Supreme Court in Milliken listed a number of difficult issues
with which a district court would have to deal. 8 It did recognize,
however, that school district boundaries are not sacrosanct, and
where they "conflict" with the fourteenth amendment federal courts
have the duty to prescribe appropriate remedies. 9
The Chief Justice felt that Bradley was based upon the conclusion
that even total desegregation of Detroit would not produce the racial
of the local school districts with funds raised through statewide taxation.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 388.1111 (Supp. 1974). In Milliken, the state
contributed an average of 34% of the operating budgets of the 54 school
districts in the proposed area; 11 of them were supplied with over 50% of
their operating budget from state revenues. 418 U.S. at 795 n.6 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
85. Attorney General v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 92 N.W. 289 (1902),
aff'd, 199 U.S. 233 (1905). This power had been used in Michigan to reduce
the number of school districts from 7,362 in 1912 to 738 in 1968. 418 U.S.
at 796 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Richmond, the institutionalization of
local control was more pervasive. Local education was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of local officials, as opposed to the state board of education.
See County School Bd. v. Griffin, 204 Va. 650, 133 S.E.2d 565 (1963).
Primary and secondary education was completely financially dependent
upon the local governing body. Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058, 1067
(4th Cir. 1972). In addition, in order for a multi-unit school district to be
created, the approval of a majority of the school board of each of the
affected counties and/or cities, and the approval of the state board of
education had to be obtained. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-100.1-.13 (1973).
86. 418 U.S. at 743-44.
87. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
88. 418 U.S. at 743. For instance, what would be the status and author-
ity of the present popularly elected school boards? What boards would levy
taxes for school operations in the consolidated districts? Richmond also
discussed administrative inconveniences. 462 F.2d at 1068; see Kaplan,
Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General Northern
Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 157, 187-88 (1963).
89. 418 U.S. at 744.
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balance perceived as desirable. 0 Two dissenting opinions took issue
with this view, stating that the lower court's focus was upon desegre-
gating Detroit's schools.' They were concerned that a Detroit-only
plan would leave many of Detroit's schools seventy-five to ninety
percent black,92 and, due to white attrition,93 would ultimately re-
sult in all black systems. 4 The majority's willingness to accept these
figures indicates a fundamental difference of interpretation of what
constitutes a desegregated education system. For the dissent, it
appears to be a system in which blacks and whites go to school
together,"9 in which there are neither black schools nor white schools
but a system of "just schools,"9 within practicable limits. 7 The
90. Id. at 740.
91. Id. at 767 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 785 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
92. Id. at 767 (White, J., dissenting).
93. White flight, with its attendant "tipping point" (the percentage of
nonwhite concentration in a given area at which whites move out), has
been noted by a number of courts. Wright v. Council of City of Emporia,
407 U.S. 451 (1972); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968);
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973);
Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal
dismissed, 497 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, No. 74-2076 (2d Cir. Jan.
27, 1975); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 368 F. Supp. 1191
(S.D. Ind. 1973); Mapp v. Board of Educ., 366 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Tenn.
1973); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 359 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Calhoun
v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga. 1971). It has been noted by commenta-
tors as well. See, e.g., Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and
the Question of Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. L. REv. 245 (1974);
Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World, The Problem of Special
Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966); Note, The Benign Housing
Quota: A Legitimate Weapon to Fight White Flight and Resulting Segre-
gated Communities?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 891 (1974). The tipping point
in any given area is dependent upon a number of variables such as the
area's income level, its distance from nonwhite ghettos, and the ethnic
makeup of the surrounding white community. Kaplan, supra at 393.
94. 418 U.S. 765, 787.
95. Id.; see Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
96. The existence of a small number of one race, or virtually one race
schools is not in and of itself an unconstitutionally segregated system.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 27 (1971).
97. 418 U.S. at 802 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Davis v. Board of
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Court's opinion points out that the Constitution neither requires
any particular degree of racial balance within a school district,98 nor
within each grade, school, or classroom.9 A desegregated, unitary
system may be one in which all the schools have large black majori-
ties. 100
The concurring opinion of Justice Stewart was crucial, for without
his vote there was no majority. He agreed with Chief Justice Burger
that the metropolitan remedy was not commensurate with the con-
stitutional violation, that the violation was to be viewed within the
context of a school district, and that there were no findings of consti-
tutional violation by suburban school districts' ° presumptively
administered in accord with the Constitution.'"2 He based his con-
currence on the tradition of local control over the schools and the
undue administrative inconveniences of judicially supervised res-
tructuring of local school administration.l 3
Justice Stewart's opinion is most notable for its assertion that an
interdistrict remedy would be appropriate were it shown that state
officials had contributed to the separation of the races by purposeful
discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws.0 4 Though aware
School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971).
98. 418 U.S. at 740. See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971).
99. 418 U.S. at 740-41. See also Spencer v. Kluger, 326 F. Supp. 1235
(D.N.J. 1971), aff'd, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972).
100. 418 U.S. at 747 n.22.
101. Id. at 754-55.
102. Id. at 755. However, a finding of significant racial imbalance in
schools within a school district shifts to the school authorities the burden
of disproving racial discrimination. Id. at 741 n.19.
103. Id. at 741.
104. Id. Restrictive zoning produces the same racial composition as
past policies of official segregation. Goodman, De Facto School Segrega-
tion: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 294
(1972). However, state action, neutral on its face, is not a denial of equal
protection merely because it more often burdens blacks than whites. James
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971). In order to invalidate the zoning it
would be necessary to show deliberate racial discrimination; mere dispro-
portionate impact is not sufficient. Goodman, supra at 299-302. For a
discussion of suburban zoning, see Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusion-
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that blacks were highly concentrated within Detroit and almost
nonexistent in the surrounding suburbs,' 5 he did not believe that
this was attributable to any governmental activity. °0 It is not clear
from his opinion what proof would be considered sufficient to con-
clude that the containment of blacks within cities is attributable to
governmental activity. The only case in which containment was an
issue was Richmond, where the court of appeals recognized govern-
mental involvement but declined to grant the requested relief., 7
In fact, practices of the federal, state, and local governments, at
every level, have contributed to the housing segregation existing
today. 08 Racially restrictive covenants were enforceable by state
courts until 1948.101 Local housing authorities explicitly assigned
people to public housing on the basis of race," 0 and public housing
ary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767
(1969).
105. 418 U.S. at 756 n.2.
106. Id. The district court had concluded that the segregated housing
patterns in the Detroit metropolitan area were in part attributable to
governmental action. 338 F. Supp. at 587. The Sixth Circuit, however, did
not rely on evidence pertaining to segregated housing, except as caused and
maintained by school construction programs. 484 F.2d at 242. Justice
Stewart stated: "[Slegregative acts within the city alone cannot be pre-
sumed to have produced-and no factual showing was made that they did
produce-an increase in the number of Negro students in the city as a
whole. It is this essential fact of a predominantly Negro school population
in Detroit-caused by unknown and perhaps unknowable factors such as
in-migration, birth rates, economic changes, or cumulative acts of private
racial fears-that accounts for 'the growing core of Negro schools,' a 'core'
that has grown to include virtually the entire city." 418 U.S. at 756 n.2
(emphasis in original).
107. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra. The court in Richmond
shared Justice Stewart's view that the causes of black concentration within
the cities were not known. 462 F.2d at 1065.
108. Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 735 (E.D.N.Y.),
appeal dismissed, 497 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, No. 74-2076 (2d Cir.
Jan. 27, 1975), quoting SENATE COMM. ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUN-
ITY, TOWARD EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, S. REP. No. 92-000, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 121-22 (1972).
109. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948).
110. Detroit Housing Comm'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955);
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill.)
(summary judgment motions), order entered on merits, 304 F. Supp. 736
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policies, neutral on their face, have resulted in segregated housing.'
The federal government is involved in housing in two ways: credit
and home financing,"2 and housing construction."' Until 1948 it
pursued a racially discriminatory housing policy. " For instance, the
1938 Underwriting Manual of the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA), still used in the 1950s,"' called for the occupation of various
properties by the same racial and economic groups"6 in the interest
of residential stability."7 It also recommended the use of restrictive
covenants against inharmonious racial groups, and model covenants
were included in the manual."8 Land adjoining that of blacks and
Mexican-Americans was considered undesirable.' These policies
helped to concentrate racial minorities in older, more deteriorated
neighborhoods as new housing built in the suburbs was denied to
them. 120 Until 1948 the FHA had not insured a single integrated
project;'' a 1959 study estimated that less than four percent of new
(N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
922 (1971).
111. Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122, 1134
(2d Cir. 1973).
112. National Housing Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-50 (1970), as
amended, (Supp. III, 1973) (creating the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA)); Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-49 (1970).
113. Housing Act of 1954, 12 U.S.C. § 1750 (1970); United States Hous-
ing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-41 (1970); Housing Act of 1949, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1441-90 (1970).
114. See text accompanying notes 115-21 infra.
115. Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143, 182 (W.D.
Mich. 1973).
116. C. ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 230 (1955) [hereinafter cited
as ABRAMS].
117. Id.
118. Id. at 231. "'[N]o persons of any race other than - [race to
be inserted] shall use or occupy any building or any lot, except that this
covenant shall not prevent occupancy by domestic servants of a different
race domiciled with an owner or tenants.'" Id. at 230, quoting FHA
UNDERWRITING MANUAL (1938).
119. ABRAMS 236.
120. R. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETrO 72 (1948); see ABRAMS 237.
121. ABRAMS 234. As of December 2, 1949, the FHA agreed not to
insure mortgages on property subject to racially restrictive covenants filed
after February 15, 1950. Id.
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homes insured by the FHA from 1946 had been made available to
nonwhites.'22 President Kennedy's Executive Order 11063 declared
that the federal government's policies were to be nondiscrimi-
natory. 23 The order, however, did not reach the millions of suburban
units subsidized by the federal government under its prior poli-
cies."24
Several courts have found that the Civil Rights Act of 19645 and
the Fair Housing Act of 196826 place an affirmative duty upon hous-
ing officials to consider the effect of their policies on integration.'27
However, a 1967 survey of FHA insured housing built after the
Executive Order found that less than four percent of the units had
been sold to blacks;'28 four years later the figure had remained ap-
proximately the same.'29 In addition, as of 1971, none of the federal
housing agencies had adequate provisions for assuring that housing
would be available on a nondiscriminatory basis, 30 nor had equal
housing opportunity procedures for mortgage lending institutions
been established.
3
'
The history of public housing is somewhat different. Prior to 1948,
nonwhites were not totally excluded from government largess;
twenty-five percent of the units were nonwhite. 32 However, the ma-
122. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HOUSING 63 (1961).
123. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652-56 (1959-63 Compilation,
1964); see 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) (historical note).
124. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 22 (1967).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1970).
126. Id. § 3601.
127. Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122, 1134
(2d Cir. 1973); Shannon v. Department of Housing and Urban Dev., 436
F.2d 809, 816 (3rd Cir. 1970). The Department of Housing and Urban
Development must consider the racial impact of its site selections.
Blackshear Residents Organization v. Housing Authority, 347 F. Supp.
1138 (W.D. Tex. 1972); Croskey St. Concerned Citizens v. Romney, 335 F.
Supp. 1251, 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 459 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1972).
128. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SUMMARY OF A REPORT 7 (1971).
129. U.S. COMM'N ON CivIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS EN-
FORCEMENT EFFORT: ONE YEAR LATER 44 (1971).
130. Id. at 56-57.
131. Id. at 67-68.
132. R. WEAVER, supra note 120, at 73-74.
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jority of the projects were either all black or all white.'33 The public
housing program has served to intensify the concentration of the
poor and nonwhite in the central cities.'34 For instance, public hous-
ing projects can only be constructed where local communities have
a workable plan for community development.' Courts in recent
years have found many instances in which local communities'36 and
the federal authorities'37 have been guilty of racial discrimination.
The discrimination has been found in tenant selection procedures,' 38
and in the selection'39 and denial'4° of public housing sites.
133. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HOUSING 4, 17 (1961).
134. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 23 (1967).
135. Housing Act of 1949 § 101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1970). Failure
to develop a workable plan for low rent public housing is not violative of
the fourteenth amendment, even where it is shown that such failure results
in perpetuating racial segregation in the absence of showing actual dis-
crimination. Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, 500
F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974); Citizens Comm. for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay,
362 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
136. See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436
F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Blackshear
Residents Organization v. Housing Authority, 347 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D.
Tex. 1972); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Crow v.
Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), afJ'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1972); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D.
Ill.) (summary judgment motions), order entered on merits, 304 F. Supp.
736 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 922 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla.
1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
137. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971);
Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F.
Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
138. See, e.g., Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d
1122 (2d Cir. 1973); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp.
907 (N.D. Ill.) (summary judgment motions), order entered on merits, 304
F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971).
139. See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436
F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Banks v. Perk,
341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382
(N.D. Ga. 1971), affd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972); Dailey v. City of
Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969), affld, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir.
1970).
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In a recent housing case, Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority,' the Seventh Circuit ordered the district court to con-
sider a metropolitan remedy. The lower court was charged with the
duty of approving a comprehensive plan to remedy the effects of
public housing segregation imposed by the Chicago Housing Au-
thority and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.'
An order to increase the housing supply, if limited to Chicago's
boundaries, would not disestablish the segregated housing system in
Chicago. To be effective, the remedial plan would have to be on a
metropolitan scale.'
The court in Gautreaux was aware of the Milliken decision but
felt it was distinguishable. Focusing upon Justice Stewart's concur-
ring opinion in Milliken, the court noted that local control in public
housing is dissimilar to that in education-the latter being federally
supervised and based on federal statute.' The administrative in-
conveniences present in Milliken dwarf those found in public hous-
ing. "5 Gautreaux found evidence of suburban discrimination that
was apparently absent in Milliken, 4 and all parties agreed that the
metropolitan area was a single relevant locality for low rent public
housing purposes.'47 In addition, the Seventh Circuit noted that the
public housing authorities have both constitutional and statutory
140. See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Banks v.
Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp.
619 (E.D. La. 1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F.
Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill.) (summary judgment motions), order entered on
merits, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971). See generally Note, Racial Discrimina-
tion in Public Housing Site Selection, 23 STAN. L. REV. 63 (1970).
141. 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 936.
144. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
145. 503 F.2d at 936. Only five housing authorities are potentially in-
volved.
146. The conclusion was based upon evidence that of 12 suburban
housing projects 10 were located in or adjacent to overwhelmingly black
census tracts. Id. at 937.
147. Id.
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responsibilities.'48 The Constitution requires housing authorities to
refrain from racial discrimination,'49 while the statutory require-
ments call for actions which further integration.'
The Milliken decision has left little promise that a court ordered
metropolitan remedy in the field of public education would be up-
held. The initial problem is to show significant segregative effect in
a second district. The opinions give no clear indication of what the
majority had in mind, but presumably the segregative impact must
be in the schools of the second district. If one were to assume that
the racial composition of the schools is at least partly responsible
for a family's decision of where to live, segregation in the city's
schools would then tend to keep whites within the city. On the other
hand, city discrimination would not explain the failure of blacks to
move to the suburbs where they would find an integrated education.
Where the suburbs are overwhelmingly white, with no history of
segregation in public education (perhaps due to the fortuitous cir-
cumstance of a scarcity of nonwhites), in the absence of demonstrat-
ing a conspiracy to keep blacks out of white suburban schools it is
difficult to imagine a segregative impact in the city. The easiest case
would appear to be where the suburbs have themselves been guilty
of racial discrimination in public education and are therefore open
to the charge that blacks were deterred from moving there, at least
in part, because the education of their children would still be segre-
gated.
The second problem to be overcome is perhaps insurmountable.
Assuming, arguendo, that an interdistrict violation was found, the
policy considerations present in Milliken-local control over the
schools and judicial inconvenience-would still be present. As no
particular degree of racial balance is required, it may still be held
that removing the bar to migration provides complete relief, without
an interdistrict plan.
The Milliken decision did not indicate whether its principle that
an interdistrict remedy requires an interdistrict violation extends to
housing litigation. The only .interdistrict housing case, Gautreaux,
held it did not. The Seventh Circuit, however, did make findings it
148. Id. at 936; see Otero v. New York Housing Authority, 484 F.2d
1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
149. See cases cited in note 139 supra.
150. See cases cited in note 127 supra.
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felt sufficient to meet the Milliken test enunciated by Justice Stew-
art, though it is unclear whether he would apply the same standard
in a housing case. There are no Supreme Court guides for housing
desegregation other than by analogy to education cases such as
Milliken.
The Milliken decision has served notice that the history of the
United States Supreme Court as an instrument for reversing the
"separation of the races" tradition in our country has entered a new
phase. For the first time since Brown I a lower court order which
sought to promote the integration of the races after finding uncon-
stitutional segregation has been reversed.
Larry M. Storm
